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The Story of YMPs
("Yield Maintenance Premiums") in Bankruptcy
Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger*
&
Michael G. Hillinger**
I. INTRODUCTION
A. General
A YMP is a yield maintenance premium or early loan termination
fee. A YMP seeks to compensate a lender "for the anticipated inter-
est [the] lender will not receive if [its] loan is paid off prematurely....
[A] prepayment premium insures the lender against loss of [its] bar-
gain if interest rates decline."1 In an earlier iteration, YMPs were
known as "prepayment penalties." Drafters of lending agreements
soon realized the term "prepayment penalty" was a poor word choice.
A lender lost its right to any prepayment penalty when it accelerated
the debt. After acceleration, prepayment is not possible because full
payment is presently due. Moreover, courts treat and test early loan
termination fees as attempts to stipulate damages. 2 As the Restate-
ment of Contracts provides, "[a] term fixing unreasonably large liqui-
dated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a
penalty."'3 The parties' own characterization of early loan termination
fees as penalties helped courts to invalidate them.
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The author wishes to thank Juliet and
Darald Libby for their generous support of research at Boston College Law School including her
own. She also wishes to thank Dean John Garvey for his support, Daniel Cohn of Cohn, White-
sell & Goldberg for inspiration and John Ventola and Charles Gerum of Choate, Hall & Stewart
for reading and commenting on a prior draft.
** Professor of Law, Southern New England School of Law. I would like to thank the
Dean's Fund of the Southern New England School of Law for supporting the research that led to
this article.
1. In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 1984).
2. See, e.g., Imperial Coronado Partners. Ltd. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Imperial
Coronado Partners, Ltd.), 96 BR. 997 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1989); In re 433 South Beverly Drive, 117
B.R. 563 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990); In re A.J. Lane & Co., 113 B.R. 821 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990);
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaumburg Hotel Owner L.P. (In re Schaumburg Hotel Owner
L.P.), 97 BR. 943 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1989); In re Planvest Equity Income Partners IV, 94 B.R. 644
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1988); In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); In re
Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500, 508 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 365(1) (1981) (emphasis added).
450 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:449
As a general proposition, YMPs do not raise eyebrows. A lender
may
enter into a loan agreement that protects it from loss of interest
through premature repayment of a loan. Otherwise, a lender that
has priced a loan based upon the expectation of a long-term com-
mitment to the contractual interest rate can be frustrated by a refi-
nancing after the filing of a bankruptcy case at a time of lower
interest rates. If secured lenders and borrowers want to contract to
protect a secured lender's interest rate through the payment of rea-
sonably calculated liquidated damages, there is no bankruptcy pol-
icy to prohibit the enforcement of such a provision.
4
YMPs are a routine, ho hum fact of lending life outside of bank-
ruptcy.5 They are not so "ho hum" in bankruptcy.6 Bankruptcy is a
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an
amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the
breach and, the difficulties of proof of loss, loss and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility
of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liqui-
dated damages is void as a penalty.
Revised U.C.C. § 2-718(1), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/annual20O2.htm.
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an
amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the
breach and, in a consumer contract, the difficulties of proof of loss, loss and the incon-
venience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. Section 2-719
determines the enforceability of a term that limits but does not liquidate damages.
Revised U.C.C. § 2-718(1), proposed cmt. 1, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/
annual2002.htm.
Changes: This section contains the following changes from original Section 2-718:
a) In subsection (a), the requirements that the party seeking to enforce a term liquidat-
ing damages demonstrate "difficulties of proof of loss" and "inconvenience or nonfeasi-
bility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy" have been eliminated in commercial
contracts.
b) In subsection (a), the sentence "[a] term fixing unreasonably large liquidated dam-
ages is void as a penalty" has been eliminated as unnecessary and capable of causing
confusion.
c) The last sentence of subsection (a) has been added to clarify the relationship be-
tween this section and Section 2-719.
Id.
4. Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 508.
5. For example, in Investment 9725 v. Bankers United Life Assurance Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d
1140 (E.D. Wis. 2003), the parties debated the proper interpretation of the YMP. Id. at 1140.
The issue of its validity or enforceability was never mentioned. Id. One commentator discussed
the advantages and disadvantages of a YMP in the commercial mortgage-backed securities
arena. George Lefcoe, Yield Maintenance & Defeasance: Two Distinct Paths to Commercial
Mortgage Prepayment, 28 REAL EST. L.J. 202 (2000).
6. That is not to say that YMPs in a bankruptcy context raise the eyebrows of all courts. Some
enforce a YMP as a matter of freedom of contract. See, e.g., In re Fin. Ctr. Assocs., 140 B.R. 829,
837-38 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing the magnitude of loan transactions and quality and
quantity of loan documents established arms-length transaction between adequately represented
sophisticated parties: "It would be offensive to the basic notion of freedom of contract if the
Debtor's argument were to prevail."). See also United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc. v. Equitable Life,
674 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Lappin Elec. Co., 245 B.R. 326, 331 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000)
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closed system. If a debtor is insolvent, recognition of a YMP, at a
minimum, means more to the YMP holder which means less to every-
one else. In one case, recognition of the YMP meant no other credi-
tor would receive any distribution.7 In a chapter 11 case, recognition
of a YMP can undermine a debtor's ability to reorganize. A success-
ful reorganization requires confirmation of a plan. Confirmation re-
quires the bankruptcy court to conclude the proposed plan is feasible. 8
Recognition of a lender's YMP-enhanced claim might make a plan
unfeasible because the debtor cannot afforde the larger payout re-
quired to satisfy the lender's claim.
This article tries to tell the story of YMPs in bankruptcy. It is not
an easy story to tell. It has so many subplots: the court's position on
freedom of contract, the debtor's solvency or insolvency, the effect of
recognizing the YMP on other creditors,9 whether the YMP claim
arose pre- or post-petition, the proper relationship between section
502 claim allowance and section 506(b) which permits oversecured
claims to include reasonable fees, costs, or charges as provided for in
the loan agreement, 10 and the effect of YMP enforcement on chapter
11 plan confirmation.
In terms of basic plot line though, the debtor will almost always
want to get rid of the YMP - somehow, some way. The YMP holder
will almost always want to enforce it.11 The debtor's other creditors
will join with the debtor to oppose YMP enforcement if enforcement
(holding that liquidated damages provision enforceable even though creditor suffered no dam-
age because formula was reasonable calculation of damages for early termination, the parties
agreed to it, they were sophisticated, they were represented by competent counsel, and transac-
tion was voluntary and at arm's length).
7. Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 1002.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 states the requirements for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129 (2001). A court cannot confirm a plan unless it is feasible. Id. "Confirmation ... is not
likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the
debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is
proposed in the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2001). See, e.g., In re Ridgewood Apts., 174
B.R. 712, 716 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (ruling on creditor's claim critical for determining plan
feasibility); Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 503 (stating that the viability of proposed plan depends on
disallowance of prepayment premium claim).
9. In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 114 B.R. 813, 818 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2001).
11. According to some courts, a creditor's secured claim cannot include both a YMP and the
contract default rate of interest. The court in In re AE Hotel Venture, 321 B.R. 209 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2005) explained:
[The oversecured creditor's] claim for default interest - the additional 5% interest that
began accruing upon AE Hotel's default - is another matter. Generally speaking,
interest compensates for the delay in receiving money owed: "the loss of the time value
of money." ... [The creditor] arrived at the interest rate it believed would compensate
for that loss in the Note .... That being so, the difference between the original rate
and the . . . default rate . . . could not have meant to perform the usual function of
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will adversely affect their position. 12 The YMP story then is really a
story about how debtors can try to invalidate or neutralize YMPs and
how YMP holders can try to make them enforceable.
B. The Relationship between a YMP and Section
1129(a) (7) (A) (ii)'s "Best Interests of Creditors" Test
Perhaps the most profound effect of recognizing a YMP occurs in
the chapter 11 plan confirmation context. Section 1129 states the re-
quirements for a confirmable plan. A court cannot confirm a pro-
posed plan unless it satisfies section 1129. Section 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii)
states what is called the "best interests of creditors" test. It applies to
nonaccepting members of impaired13 classes of claims (creditors)' 4
and interest holders (owners). According to section 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii),
a court cannot confirm a plan unless the plan gives dissenting 15 mem-
interest. The time value of [the creditor's] money ... did not magically increase by 5%
once [the debtor] defaulted.
Default interest is instead designed to reimburse creditors for "extra costs incurred
after default." Default interest, then, is not true interest at all. It is a form of late
charge and thus is a "charge" for purposes of section 506(b) .....
Because [the creditor's] default interest is actually a charge, it must be "reasonable" to
be allowed.... Default interest is not a "reasonable" charge, however, because it com-
pensates for an injury that has already been compensated in some other way under the
parties' agreement.
Id. at 215. But see In re Vanderveer Estates Holdings, 283 B.R. 122, 134 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding, in context of solvent debtor, creditor can recover both YMP and default interest be-
cause a YMP is structured to provide creditor with present value of the interest it loses from
prepayment, whereas default interest compensates for administrative expenses and inconve-
nience of monitoring untimely payments).
12. If a debtor is solvent, all creditors, by definition, will receive payment in full. If so, the
YMP battle will involve only the debtor and the secured creditor-YMP holder. See, e.g., Wetzel
v. Advocate Realty Investments, LLC (In re Welzel), 275 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(attorney's fees), In re 360 Inns, Ltd., 76 B.R. 573 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (YMP).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2001) defines nonimpairment. For purposes of this article, "impair-
ment" means any alteration in a creditor's legal, equitable or contractual rights. The nature of
the alteration - for good or for bad - is irrelevant. In re Barrington Oaks General P'ship, 15 B.R.
952, 967-68 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). It is the fact of change in rights, not the nature of the
change, that establishes impairment. Most plans impair most classes. Hence, in most cases,
§ 1129(a)(7) applies.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000) (defining "claim") and 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (2000) (defining
"creditor").
15. Impaired classes of claims and interest holders are entitled to vote on a chapter 11 plan.
Section 1124 defines impairment. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2000). Section 1126 states when a class
accepts a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2000). According to § 1126(c), a class of claims accepts a plan
if at least two-thirds in amount and more than half in number of those voting accept. § 1126(c).
A class of interests accepts if two thirds in amount of those voting accept. § 1126(d).
Section 1129(a)(7) is stated in the alternative. Each member of an impaired class must either
vote to accept the proposed plan or receive what it would have received in a hypothetical liqui-
dation on the effective date of the plan.
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bers of an impaired class of claims at least what they would receive "if
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on"'16 the effec-
tive date of the plan. 17 To determine what the "best interests of credi-
tors" test requires for a class of creditors, one must do a hypothetical
chapter 7 liquidation analysis to determine what creditors in that class
would receive in a chapter 7 case.18 The plan must provide dissenting
creditors with at least that much or the court cannot confirm the
plan.19
At a minimum, recognizing a YMP as part of the lender's secured
claim will increase the amount the lender must receive under a plan to
satisfy the best interests test. That could decrease what other credi-
tors receive under the plan. It could also negate the possibility of con-
firmation by rendering the plan unfeasible.
C. A Hypothetical
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the connection between a
YMP and section 1129(a)(7)'s "best interests of creditors" test. As-
sume D borrows $10 million from C in year 1. C's loan is secured by a
valid interest in Blackacre, valued at $15 million. D promises to re-
pay C $10 million over thirty years at ten percent interest. The loan
agreement requires D to pay C an additional $2 million if D prepays
the loan during the first ten years.
In year 2, D petitions for chapter 11 relief. Assume C's allowed
claim is $10 million without the YMP and $12 million with it. Black-
acre is still valued at $15 million. Therefore, C's claim is oversecured.
D's plan puts C in its own class. Under the plan, C will retain its lien
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2000).
17. The "best interests of creditors" test also applies to dissenting members of an impaired
class of interest holders. The point is unimportant in the context of YMPS which are held by
creditors, typically secured creditors.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 726 details the chapter 7 distribution scheme. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2000). Es-
sentially, after secured claims are paid or the collateral is surrendered to the lien holder, the
chapter 7 trustee must first pay all priority claims described in section 507 in the order in which
they are listed there. § 726(a)(1). Next the trustee must pay all nonpriority, timely filed un-
secured claims. § 726(a)(2). Thereafter, late filed nonpriority unsecured claims. § 726(a)(3).
After that come punitive, that is, noncompensatory penalties, fines, forfeitures and damages.
§ 726(a)(4). The fifth rung entitles claim holders to interest. § 726(a)(5).
19. Section 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) only applies to dissenting members of a class. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2000). However, section 1123(a)(4) provides that a plan must provide the
same treatment for all members of a class unless a member agrees to less favorable treatment.
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2000). Because a plan proponent must assume some members of an
impaired class will object and therefore, the plan must satisfy the best interests test as to them
and the plan must provide the same treatment for all members of a class, a plan will propose to
give any impaired class at least what its members would receive in a liquidation. The "best
interests" test establishes a floor, a minimum treatment the plan will provide.
4532005]
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in Blackacre. Moreover, C will receive deferred cash payments with a
present value equal to $10 million. The plan nowhere provides-for C's
YMP.
C is indignant (as well as hostile to D's reorganization attempt). C
votes to reject the plan. Moreover, C objects to confirmation of the
plan at the plan confirmation hearing. C makes the following argu-
ment: D's plan alters its contractual and legal rights because it does
not provide for C's YMP. Therefore, D's plan impairs its claim and
section 1129(a)(7) applies. C did not accept D's plan. Consequently,
the court cannot confirm D's plan unless C receives under the plan at
least what it would have received in a hypothetical liquidation on the
plan's effective date. In a hypothetical liquidation, C would have re-
ceived $12 million in cash - its $10 million in principal and its $2
million YMP.
But wait. D's plan is not proposing to prepay C's loan. If D is not
prepaying, is C's YMP even triggered? Yes, it is. It is triggered be-
cause prepayment would occur in a liquidation. A liquidation would
result in prepayment. In a liquidation, therefore, C would be entitled
to its YMP. In a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation on the effective
date of the plan, C would receive $12 million, not $10 million. Thus,
confirmation of D's plan would require cash payments to C having a
present value equal to $12 million, not $10 million.
Concluding that a lender's secured claim includes the YMP can
make a big difference. Paying the present value of $10 million over
time is different from paying the present value of $12 million. Recog-
nizing a YMP in bankruptcy permits the YMP holder to lessen the
trauma of its borrower's bankruptcy. A YMP can protect the lender
against the loss that results when its borrower "re-writes" the loan in
its chapter 11 plan. From a lender's perspective, a YMP is a nifty
device. And we hasten to add, some YMPs are hardly "ymp
change." 20
The above hypothetical assumes two things: (1) the YMP is enforce-
able, and (2) the YMP is triggered. And therein lies the tale. As
Judge Yacos observed, "whether prepayment premiums . . . are en-
forceable ... is not a sterile theoretical analytical activity under the
case law. The courts actually engage in a fact-specific inquiry into the
particular circumstances surrounding the secured creditor and the
debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding. ' 21 The debtor's status as sol-
vent or insolvent seems to influence the outcome of many cases in-
20. See, e.g., Pub. Serv., 114 B.R. 813 ($9.3 million YMP); Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. 997 ($2,173,000
YMP); In re Hidden Lake L.P., 247 B.R. 722, 725 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000) ($2,699,487 YMP).
21. Pub. Serv., 114 B.R. at 818.
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volving YMPs. If a debtor is insolvent, recognition of a YMP can
diminish if not eliminate any payout to unsecured creditors. 22 It might
even quash the debtor's reorganization. 23 When a debtor is solvent,
the only protagonists are the debtor and the lender. They are fighting
over who gets the money. In that situation, there is no reason not to
enforce the contract the parties freely made. There is no reason not to
give the lender the benefit of its bargain.
24
Most chapter 11 debtors are not solvent. In most cases, then, recog-
nition of a lender's YMP will adversely affect the debtor's other credi-
tors. The story of YMPs is a story of judicial and lender ingenuity. As
courts devise ways to deny effect to a YMP, lenders have drafted new,
improved YMPs. Although the story will continue to unfold, at the
moment, lenders with carefully drafted YMPs appear to have the
edge.
II. YMPs AND SECTION 502(B)(2)
A YMP seeks to compensate a creditor "for the anticipated interest
a lender will not receive if the loan is paid off prematurely. ' 25 Seem-
ingly, anticipated interest is unearned or unmatured interest. Section
502(b)(2) disallows interest that is unmatured as of the date of a bank-
ruptcy petition. Does section 502(b)(2) disallow YMPs?
In In re Ridgewood Apartments,26 the court concluded the YMP
represented unmatured interest, and therefore section 502(b)(2) disal-
lowed it.27 The secured creditor in Ridgewood, Fannie Mae, was un-
dersecured. Fannie Mae took the position that its claim included the
YMP because its loan agreement with the debtor provided for a pre-
payment premium and the YMP was triggered prepetition when it ac-
celerated the debtor's obligation.
The court scrutinized the loan documents to conclude the prepay-
ment premium was only triggered upon prepayment. "Had Fannie
Mae intended the penalty to be payable upon acceleration, the [con-
tract] should have stated that specifically. '28 The court went on to
22. See, e.g., Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 999 (noting that if YMP allowed, no other creditor will
receive any distribution).
23. See, e.g., Ridgewood Apts., 174 B.R. at 716 (ruling on creditor's claim critical for determin-
ing plan feasibility); Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 503 (viability of proposed plan depends on disallow-
ance of prepayment premium claim).
24. See Vanderveer Estates Holdings, 283 B.R. 122; 360 Inns, 76 B.R. 573.
25. LHD Realty, 726 F.2d at 330.
26. 174 B.R. 712 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
27. Id. at 721.
28. Id. at 720. (emphasis added).
2005]
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explain why a contrary conclusion would run counter to bankruptcy's
goals:
the essence of a bankruptcy reorganization under chapter 11 is to
restructure debt, decelerate debts, and adjust debtor-creditor rela-
tionships. It would be anomalous for acceleration of an obligation
to be construed as a prepayment which triggered the application of
a penalty. Even without specific contractual language, a bankruptcy
filing acts as an acceleration of all a debtor's obligations.29
Prepetition, the debtor had not prepaid the note nor did the
debtor's plan propose to do so. Therefore, "no prepayment penalty
was due or owing prior to the debtor's bankruptcy filing and such an
amount is not properly part of Fannie Mae's claim." o30 It was only a
short step from there to the conclusion that Fannie Mae's claim for the
prepayment premium was a contingent claim at the commencement of
the debtor's bankruptcy case. It was contingent because prepayment
had not occurred at that point. That contingent claim was for unma-
tured interest. That contingent claim for unmatured interest was held
by an undersecured creditor. Undersecured creditors are not entitled
to postpetition interest. 31 The YMP had fallen on its own sword.
The clear'purpose for a prepayment penalty is to compensate the
lender for the risk that market rates of interest at the time of pre-
payment might be lower than the rate of the loan being prepaid.
Such a provision would compensate the lender for anticipated inter-
est that would not be received if the loan were paid prematurely....
As an attempt to compensate the lender for potential loss in interest
income, Fannie Mae's claim for a prepayment penalty is not allowed
under ... section 502(b)(2). 32
Invalidating a lender's right to a YMP as unmatured interest will
not work if the loan documents provide that the prepayment charge is
due and payable in the event of any voluntary or involuntary prepay-
ment including acceleration and the lender accelerates the debt prepe-
tition. After acceleration, the interest is no longer unmatured. It
becomes due upon acceleration. And so the very same judge who in-
validated the YMP in Ridgewood Apartments as unmatured interest
concluded section 502(b)(2) did not disallow the YMP when the credi-
tor had accelerated the debt prepetition. 33
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988).
32. Ridgewood Apts., 174 B.R. at 720-21.
33. Hidden Lake, 247 B.R. at 730. The court noted a different result might have obtained had
no acceleration occurred prepetition and the note had given the creditor a right to accelerate
upon the debtor's filing of bankruptcy. Id. "Under the facts of this case, however, the Court
agrees with the existing case law that a prepayment charge imposed prepetition is not a claim for
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Today, the chance of invalidating a YMP as unearned interest seems
remote. As another Ohio bankruptcy court explained in In re Out-
door Sports Headquarters, "prepayment amounts... do not constitute
unmatured interest because they fully mature pursuant to the provi-
sions of the contract. ' 34 As the court saw it, a creditor has a right to
receive the prepayment premium "if payment of the entire amount
due ... is made prior to the full term of the contract. '35 Said another
way, "prepayment premiums . . . fully mature at the time of breach
and [therefore] do not represent unmatured interest."
36
Moreover, even if a YMP represents a right to unearned interest as
of the petition date, that will not invalidate it if the YMP holder is
oversecured. Section 506(b) permits oversecured claims to accrue
postpetition interest. And, in fact, most of the case law involving
YMPs in bankruptcy involves oversecured creditors. And curiously
(or maybe, not so curiously), the courts do not characterize the YMP
as unmatured interest. Rather, the YMP is a "charge." Section
506(b) recognizes (allows) "reasonable charges provided for under the
agreement . . . . 37
III. THE VOLUNTARY/INVOLUNTARY DISTINCTION
In some cases, a court has refused to enforce the YMP because pre-
payment was not "voluntary." The court, somewhat mysteriously,
holds an involuntary payment does not trigger the YMP. Characteriz-
ing the nature of the prepayment as "involuntary" can seem like a
magical incantation which, when recited by the court, makes the YMP
disappear. For example, one court wrote that the lender's "argument
that it would be entitled to the prepayment penalty in a liquidation is
not persuasive because payment of the debt resulting from liquidation
would not constitute a 'voluntary' prepayment. '38 Say what? The
court went on to observe that "it is recognized that a debtor's disposi-
tion of property under a Chapter 11 may be involuntary.' 39 Why
should a debtor's involuntary prepayment fail to trigger the YMP?
unmatured interest within the meaning of § 502(b)(2)." Id. See also In re Outdoor Sports Head-
quarters, Inc., 161 B.R. 414, 424 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993); Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 508.
34. 161 B.R. 414, 424 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
35. Id.
36. Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 508 (emphasis added) (citing 360 Inns, 76 B.R. at 576).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000). Arguably, § 506(b)'s reasonableness requirement is limited to
fees, costs and charges and does not apply to postpetition interest.
38. Planvest Equity Income Partners IV, 94 B.R. at 644.
39. Id. (emphasis in original).
2005]
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The court's discussion in In re Public Service Company of New
Hampshire40 sheds light on the opaque voluntary/involuntary distinc-
tion. In Public Service, the creditors were senior secured bondholders.
The bonds provided for a prepayment premium if the borrower, at its
option, prepaid the bonds. The court went to great lengths to describe
why nothing about the debtor's chapter 11 filing or its treatment of
the bondholders constituted "an exercise of a voluntary 'option' by
the borrower. '41 The debtor was forced to seek chapter 11 relief be-
cause it could not recover the costs of its completed but unlicensed
nuclear plant.42 The YMP was triggered only by a "'voluntary' call for
a redemption of the bonds in the 'option of the Company' sense in-
tended by the indentures involved. '43 The plan provision for paying
the bonds was also not voluntary because the debtor had lost its exclu-
sivity period and the plan's treatment was principally a product of a
"takeover plan by another utility. '44 Because the bonds defined the
circumstances triggering the YMP and those circumstances never oc-
curred, the bondholders' claim did not include the YMP.45
The facts in In re Imperial Coronado Partners, Ltd. v. Home Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Imperial Coronado Partners, Ltd.)46 were
similar. The loan agreement allowed the borrower to pay off the loan
early if the borrower paid the prepayment premium. "In general, such
a provision is interpreted to mean that the prepayment premium is
allowed only where the prepayment is voluntary. 47 Two judges of the
B.A.P. panel concluded the debtor's section 363 sale of the property
was voluntary, rendering its prepayment of the lender's loan volun-
tary. According to the majority, it was not a question of whether the
debtor, as a practical matter, could afford to exercise its right to rein-
state the loan. Rather, it was a question of "whether it had the right
to reinstate the loan. It did." 48 For the majority, the debtor had as-
sessed its situation and had decided that it made more business sense
to sell the property than to reinstate the loan. It was a "conscious
decision" on the debtor's part.49 Therefore, "the decision to sell the
40. 114 B.R. 813 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990).
41. Id. at 819.
42. Id. at 815.
43. Id. at 818.
44. Id. at 819.
45. See also LHD Realty, 726 F.2d 327.
46. 96 B.R. 997 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1989).
47. Id. at 999.
48. Id. at 1000.
49. Id.
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property and pay off the loan was voluntary, and the prepayment pre-
mium ... [was] enforceable. '50
According to the dissent, "payments made pursuant to judicial ac-
tion are uniformly defined as involuntary. ... ",51 Because the court
had ordered a sale of the property under section 363, the debtor's pay-
ment was involuntary. Moreover, most parties who file bankruptcy
have few meaningful options. An approach that enforces a penalty
provision when a debtor's only feasible alternative is to sell property
and pay off the lender is an approach that favors form over substance
and ignores bankruptcy's equitable nature.
52
A chapter 7 liquidation results in an involuntary payment. If the
YMP is only triggered when the borrower elects to prepay, a lender
would not be entitled to its YMP in a debtor's liquidation. Moreover,
section 1129(a)(7)'s "best interests of creditors" test would not require
the debtor's plan to include the YMP as part of the lender's claim. A
creditor must receive under the plan at least what it would have re-
ceived in a hypothetical liquidation on the effective date of the plan.
If a YMP is only triggered by a debtor's voluntary payment and a
chapter 7 liquidation involves an involuntary payment, the lender
would not be entitled to the YMP in a liquidation. Consequently, a
court could confirm a plan even if it did not provide for the lender's
YMP. 53
From a lender's perspective, the moral of this part of the case law
story is clear. Do not condition a YMP on the borrower's option or
election to prepay. And so, Fannie Mae's loan documents in In re
Ridgewood Apts. provided that "the prepayment premium would be
due whether the prepayment is voluntary or involuntary (in connec-
tion with Lender's acceleration of the unpaid principal balance of the
Note) or the Instrument is satisfied or released by foreclosure
(whether by power of sale or judicial proceeding), deed in lieu of fore-
closure or by any other means."' 54 Another more recently drafted
YMP took a different tack. It provided:
if after an event of default and "at any time prior to a sale of the
Mortgaged Property ... either through foreclosure or the exercise
of other remedies available to the Payee, [the debtor] pays an
amount sufficient to satisfy the debt under the Note, that payment
50. Id.
51. Imperial Coronado Partners, 96 B.R. at 1001.
52. Id.
53. See Pub. Serv., 114 B.R. at 819 (noting that in liquidation, bondholders would not receive
prepayment premium because redemption would not be voluntary).
54. Ridgewood Apts., 174 B.R. at 720; see also Vanderveer Estates Holdings, 283 B.R. 122 at
125.
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will be deemed "a voluxtary repayment" and [the debtor] will be
obligated to pay an additional "prepayment consideration. '55
IV. WAIVER OF A YMP
According to the case law, a lender can waive its right to a prepay-
ment premium. Courts finding a waiver typically rely on In re LHD
Realty Corp.56 to support their conclusion. In LHD Realty, the Sev-
enth Circuit had no problem recognizing the general validity of rea-
sonable prepayment premiums.57 The court believed YMPs serve a
valid purpose - they compensate lenders for anticipated interest they
will not receive if prepayment occurs. 58 But the court acknowledged
some limitations on a lender's right to receive such a prepayment pre-
mium. For instance, the lender who chooses to accelerate its debt
loses its right to such a premium.5 9 Why? "[B]ecause acceleration, by
definition, advances the maturity date of the debt so that payment
thereafter is not prepayment but instead is payment made after
maturity."60
According to the court, when the lender has the option to
accelerate,
it is only necessary that the mortgagee show an unmistakable inten-
tion to exercise the option and this may be done by taking steps for
foreclosure, filing a foreclosure suit, sale pursuant to the mortgage
or advertisement of the property for sale pursuant to the terms of a
mortgage.61
The court concluded the lender had exercised its option to accelerate
at the latest when it sought relief from the automatic stay.62 The court
characterized the lender's action as sensible. No doubt, "it preferred
... accelerated payment over the 'opportunity' to earn interest from
the ... loan over a period of years." 63
55. AE Hotel Venture, 321 B.R. at 213. As the court noted, parties by appropriate contract
provisions can overcome the usual effect of acceleration on the enforceability of a YMP. Id. at
218.
56. 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984).
57. Id. at 330.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 330-331 (emphasis added). The court noted two other limitations: prepayment when
property is condemned by the government exercising its power of eminent domain and prepay-
ment when mortgaged property is destroyed by "an insured-against casualty such as a fire." Id.
at 331.
61. LHD Realty, 726 F.2d at 331.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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The lender argued that a rule precluding lenders from a prepayment
premium upon acceleration would encourage borrowers to intention-
ally default - to invite acceleration and foreclosure - because that
would negate the premium. The court rejected the argument, both
because it was implausible given the other ramifications of default for
a borrower and because courts could refuse to apply the acceleration
exception in the face of borrower abuse.
64
LHD Realty counsels lenders to forbear from exercising their op-
tion to accelerate. Such forbearance will preserve their right to en-
force "an otherwise valid prepayment premium. '65
The court in In re Pinebrook, Ltd.66 suggested a further rationale
for the waiver rule announced in LHD Realty. Basically, the
Pinebrook court took a lender-can't-have-its-cake-and-eat-it-too ap-
proach. If a lender demands immediate payment by accelerating the
indebtedness, it can't then penalize the debtor for prepaying pursuant
to that demand. "It is this Court's understanding that a party is not
entitled to both an acceleration of. its debt and a prepayment
penalty. 67
In Public Service of New Hampshire, the court found a waiver in the
indenture trustees' consistent opposition to any plan that did not cash
out their bondholders. 68 In LHD Realty, the lender's motion for relief
from the stay was sufficient conduct to establish the lender's intention
to exercise its option to accelerate. 69
Every schoolchild knows that the filing of bankruptcy accelerates all
debts. 70 Will bankruptcy's automatic acceleration eliminate a lender's
right to a YMP? According to one court, no.71 If bankruptcy's auto-
matic acceleration of debts were to defeat a YMP, no YMP would
ever be enforceable in bankruptcy. Such a rule would permit a bor-
rower to "avoid the effect of a prepayment premium by filing a bank-
64. Id.
65. Id. at 332.
66. 85 B.R. 160 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
67. Id. at 162.
68. Pub. Serv., 114 B.R. at 816.
69. LHD Realty, 726 F.2d at 331 (7th Cir. 1984). See also In re Duralite Truck Body &
Container Corp., 153 B.R. 708 (Bankr. D. Md. 1993) (creditor prompted prepayment by its col-
lection efforts: when a lender exercises its option to accelerate upon default, the economic justi-
fication for a prepayment premium as alternative performance of the bargained loan is
negated.); Planvest Equity Income Partners IV, 94 B.R. at 645 (it is questionable whether credi-
tor is entitled to YMP when it sought to lift automatic stay).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2000).
71. Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500.
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ruptcy case. Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor case law compels the
invalidation of a properly drawn premium clause in all cases."
72
Today, the question of waiver seems to be a non-starter. Presuma-
bly after the waiver case law churned out, prepayment penalties un-
derwent a name change. They morphed into yield maintenance
premiums that became due upon acceleration. That way, acceleration
would trigger rather than nullify the lender's right to receive compen-
sation for interest lost.
V. A YMP's ENFORCEABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY
A. YMPs and Sections 502(b)(1) and 506(b): Overview
Section 502(b)(1) generally disallows claims that are not enforcea-
ble under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 73 Section 502(b)(1)'s policy
seems obvious. Why should bankruptcy recognize a creditor's right to
payment when applicable nonbankruptcy law does not?74 Some
courts do not evaluate a YMP's enforceability under section 502(b)(1)
and applicable nonbankruptcy law. 75 Apparently, those courts have
impliedly concluded that section 506(b) states a federal standard of
reasonableness, independent of state law, and therefore, no analysis
under applicable nonbankruptcy law, e.g., state law, is necessary.
Such a conclusion requires closer scrutiny.
Section 506(a) defining "secured claim" provides: "an allowed claim
of a creditor secured by a lien in which the estate has an interest...
[is] a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest
in the estate's interest in such property ... and [is] an unsecured claim
to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than
the amount of such allowed claim."' 76 According to one court, "unless
there is an underlying right to payment under non-bankruptcy law,
there is no allowed secured claim under ... [section] 506(b). ' 77 Sec-
tion 506(a) seems to suggest that a creditor cannot have an allowed
secured claim unless it has an allowed claim. A creditor cannot have
an allowed claim unless it files a proof of claim under section 501 and
72. Id. at 507.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2000) disallows a claim "to the extent that - (1) such claim is
unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable
law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured ... ". 11 U.S.C. §
502(b)(1) (2000).
74. Unmatured claims and contingent claims are the exception to the exception. Bankruptcy
does recognize them, i.e., they are allowable in bankruptcy even though they would not be en-
forceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2000).
75. See, e.g., Duralite Truck Body & Container, 153 B.R. 708.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
77. Skyler Ridge, 80 BR. at 503.
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it is deemed allowed, or the court, after objection, allows it under sec-
tion 502. Are courts mistaken then when they do not stop at section
502 but instead go directly to section 506 to analyze the enforceability
of a YMP? Maybe not, even though a creditor cannot have an al-
lowed secured claim unless it has an allowed claim under section 502.
A YMP analysis under section 506 involves section 506(b). Section
506(b) appears to discuss an oversecured creditor's situation postpeti-
tion. According to section 506(b), an oversecured creditor's claim can
include postpetition interest and "any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim
arose."' 78 Although the statute is not explicit, one could easily con-
clude section 506(b)'s reference to "fees, costs and charges provided
for under the agreement" also refers to postpetition fees, costs and
charges. But, at least one court has said section 506(b) applies to
prepetition as well as postpetition fees, costs and charges. 79 Other
courts, by analyzing a prepetition YMP claim under section 502, think
otherwise. 80 It is also possible to characterize a YMP that only comes
due postpetition as a contingent right to payment as of the petition
date. 81 Therefore, section 502 would initially govern its enforceability.
The case law here is inconsistent in the extreme. Courts go every
which way, half the time not explaining why they went where they
went and why they did not go somewhere else. What follows are the
basic analytical approaches courts have taken to test the enforceability
of a YMP in bankruptcy.
B. Forward "Two-Step" Approach: First Section 502,
Then Section 506
According to some courts, evaluation of a YMP's enforceability in-
volves a two-step process. First, the court must consider its enforce-
ability under applicable state law. If state law would give it effect, the
court will proceed to section 506(b) to determine if it is reasonable. 82
In Noonan v. Fremont Financial (In re Lappin Electric Co.),8 3 the
creditors had filed an involuntary chapter 7 against the debtor. The
debtor's assets were sold to a third party and Fremont Financial was
78. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000).
79. In re Center, 282 B.R. 561 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2002).
80. Hidden Lake, 247 B.R. 722.
81. In In re Keaton, 182 B.R. 203 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995), the court characterized an under-
secured creditor's right to postpetition attorney's fees as a contingent right to attorney's fees as
of the petition date and therefore allowable as part of its claim. Id. at 210.
82. See, e.g., Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500; Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 1001 (YMP is unenforceable
under Missouri law and unreasonable under § 506(b)).
83. 245 B.R. 326 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000).
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paid its full secured claim of over $ 4 million, including a "prepayment
fee" of $225,000.84 The chapter 7 trustee brought an adversary pro-
ceeding against Fremont to recover the $225,000 prepayment fee for
the estate.85 The trustee argued the secured creditor had suffered no
actual loss, and therefore, the fee was unreasonable under section
506(b). 86 The secured creditor countered that the fee was reasonable
under both state law and section 506(b). 87
The court refused to jump straight into section 506(b). Instead, it
adopted a "two-pronged approach" to determine the fee's reasonable-
ness.88 First, the YMP had to be valid at state law. And, if valid at
state law, it also had to be a reasonable charge under section 506(b). 89
If the fee was unenforceable at state law, the court would disallow it
under section 502(b)(1). 90 Even if enforceable at state law, section
506(b) would disallow it if it was unreasonable. 91
Turning to the first prong, the court looked to Illinois stipulated
damages law.92 The court concluded that "[t]aken as a whole, the ter-
mination fee ... is a reasonable calculation of potential damages, and
it meets the requirements of Illinois law."'93
Turning to the second prong, the court noted that bankruptcy courts
were split over what section 506(b)'s reasonableness requirement en-
tailed. 94 According to one line of cases, section 506(b) limits a credi-
tor's recovery to actual costs, charges, and fees.95 Although the court
found the concept of limiting recovery to actual damages "attractive,"
that formula was impossible to apply in a line of credit situation.
96
Following another line of cases, the court tested the reasonableness of
the prepayment charge using a liquidated damages analysis.97 The
court found the fee reasonable under section 506(b). 98 Although the
court seemed to assume a federal liquidated damages standard
governed its analysis, it would have reached the same result had it
84. Id. at 328.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 329.
87. Id.
88. Lappin, 245 B.R. at 329.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Lappin, 245 B.R. at 330.
94. Id.
95. Id. (collecting cases).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 330-31 (collecting cases).
98. Lappin, 245 B.R. at 331.
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used a state standard in applying section 506(b)'s reasonableness
requirement.
In Lappin, the lender's right to a YMP arose postpetition. In In re
AE Hotel Venture,99 the lender's YMP claim arose prepetition, but the
court applied the same two-pronged approach. 1°° In AE Hotel, the
debtor had defaulted prepetition and the lender sought judicial fore-
closure six months later.10' Three days after the lender filed in state
court, the debtor sought chapter 11 protection.10 2 The property was
sold, and the lender requested late fees,10 3 default interest and a pre-
payment premium under sections 506(a) and (b).0 4
The court summarily disposed of the lender's claim for default in-
terest (5% above the contract rate).10 5 The court characterized the
claim as a charge, rather than interest, and concluded it was not rea-
sonable under section 506(b).10 6 The lender had already received late
charges. 10 7 Recovering default interest would have compensated it
twice for a single injury. It could receive late charges or default inter-
est, but not both.10 8
The court then turned to the YMP. It applied the same two-pro-
nged test.'0 9 The YMP had to be enforceable under state law and
reasonable under section 506(b).110 Whether a charge was reasonable
was, "of course, a question of federal law." '' Applying Illinois liqui-
dated damages law, the court had no problem finding the premium
enforceable. 1 2 The court also quickly disposed of the debtor's argu-
ment that the premium was not "provided for under the agree-
ment."11' 3 It was, and that was that. 114 Because the debtor did not
question the reasonableness of the prepayment premium, 115 the court
99. 321 B.R. 209 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 214.
102. Id.
103. The debtor did not object to the late fees. Id. at 215.
104. AE Hotel Venture, 321 B.R. at 214.
105. Id. at 215.
106. Id. at 216.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. AE Hotel Venture, 321 B.R. at 217.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 219-20.
113. Id. at 217-18
114. AE Hotel Venture, 321 B.R. at 217-18.
115. Id. (it only questioned whether the YMP was "provided for under the agreement" and
whether it was enforceable under state law).
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did not need to reach the ."difficult question" of the proper federal
standard for reasonableness under section 506(b). 116
In Ferrari v. Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc.(In re Morse
Tool, Inc.), 117 the lender and the chapter 7 trustee had filed cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment to determine the YMP's enforceabil-
ity.118 The court did not reach the ultimate issue because the
existence of several genuine issues of material fact made summary
judgment inappropriate.' 19 Nevertheless, the court took the opportu-
nity to set out its analytic structure for deciding the issue. First, the
court would evaluate the YMP's enforceability at state law pursuant
to section 502(b)(1).120 If enforceable at state law, it would consider
the YMP's reasonableness under section 506(b). 121 Although the
court did not decide if the YMP was enforceable, it staked out its posi-
tion. It would hold the YMP reasonable under section 506(b) only if
it provided for "actual and necessary damages.' 22 Therefore, even if
the YMP. met Connecticut standards for liquidated damages, the
lender would still have to prove its actual loss as a result of
prepayment. 123
C. Section 502 Alone Governs YMPs that Become Due Prepetition
In re Leatherland Corp. 24 involved a "success fee.' 25 The credi-
tors' committee maintained the "success fee" was unreasonable, both
because it was an invalid penalty under state law, and because it was
unreasonable under section 506(b).126 The secured creditor countered
that the success fee was not a "fee" within the meaning of section
116. Id. at 221. The court noted two lines of cases. The first, which it characterized as the
majority, limits recovery to the actual damages the creditor suffered from the prepayment. Id.
These courts also often "examine the equities" of awarding the premium. Id. The minority view
evaluates prepayment premiums as liquidated damages clauses. Id. n.10 (collecting cases).
117. 87 B.R. 745 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 751 (the court concluded it did not have sufficient information to decide whether
the YMP was enforceable under Connecticut.law or what the creditor's actual damages were).
120. Id. at 748.
121. Id.
122. Morse Tool, 87 B.R. at 750.
123. Id.
124. 302 B.R. 250 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003).
125. Id. This was a payment
equal to two percent of the highest principal sum due under the note during the period
from May 31, 2002, to January 31, 2003. The ..."Success Fee" [would have been]
waived if by December 31, 2002, and January 31, 2003, the outstanding principal
amount due is reduced as required in the agreement.
Id. at 252-53.
126. Id. at 253.
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506(b) and therefore, it was not subject to a reasonableness
determination. 127
The court first examined "whether an oversecured creditor's claim
for a fee that matured prepetition is subject to the section 506(b) rea-
sonableness standard. ' 128 It noted that the courts, relying on section
506(b)'s plain meaning, disagreed on whether section 506(b) applied
to prepetition as well as postpetition fees, charges, etc.129
The court's own examination of section 506(b)'s plain language led
it to agree with those courts that concluded it only applied to fees that
accrued postpetition. 130 The court noted a contrary conclusion could
lead to absurd results:
For example, if a secured creditor is undersecured by one dollar,
[section] 506(b) does not apply and the creditor has an allowed
claim that includes all prepetition fees and charges that are enforce-
able against the debtor and property of the debtor under its agree-
ment or applicable law. . . No additional reasonableness
determination need be made. But if the secured creditor is over-
secured by one dollar, the same prepetition fees and charges may
not be allowed after subjecting them to the [section] 506(b) reason-
ableness standard .... The Court does not believe that Congress
intended such an anomalous result. Rather, the purpose of [section]
506(b) is to permit a creditor to collect certain postpetition addi-
tions from the collateral securing its claim only to the extent that it
is oversecured.131
Therefore, the court had to determine whether the prepetition suc-
cess fee was part of the lender's allowed claim under section 502(b). 132
The court assumed it had- to allow the success fee under section
502(b)(1) if it was enforceable against the debtor "under any agree-
ment or applicable law. .... ",133 Moreover, the court agreed with the
creditors' committee that Ohio's liquidated damages rules were the
applicable law. 134
On the merits, the court performed a close examination of Ohio
liquidated damages law.' 35 In the end, it concluded "the Success Fee"
provision is, and was intended to be, nothing more than a penalty for
127. Id.
128. Id. at 256.
129. Leatherland, 302 B.R. at 256-58 (collecting cases).
130. Id. at 258.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 257.
133. Id. at 259 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1)).
134. Leatherland, 302 B.R. at 259.
135. Id. at 259-64.
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failure to pay down the principal balance."' 36 Therefore, it was not
part of the creditor's allowed claim. 137
The court in In re Hidden Lake L.P.138 also relied exclusively on
section 502 to evaluate the enforceability of a $2,699,487 YMP.139
Like Leatherland, it involved application of Ohio stipulated damages
law. The court noted recognition of the YMP would potentially
overcompensate the lender. 140 It would also complicate the debtor's
attempt to reorganize. 141 Nevertheless, a careful examination of Ohio
law required it to conclude the YMP was a valid liquidated damages
clause rather than a penalty. 142 The debtor also argued that the YMP
was a claim for unmatured interest and barred by section 502(b)(2). 143
The court considered but rejected this argument because the lender's
entitlement to the YMP arose on its acceleration of the debt, and
hence it had matured long before the debtor filed for chapter 11
relief.144
D. Section 506(b) Alone Governs a YMPs Enforceability
According to some courts, section 506(b) alone controls a YMP's
validity and enforceability. 145 Within that camp, courts divide on
whether "reasonableness" is determined under a federal or state
standard. 146
1. The Proper Standard Is a Federal One
Although it focuses on the treatment of attorney's fees rather than
YMPs under section 506(b), Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Walter
E. Heller & Co. (In re K.H. Stephenson Supply Co.) 147 provides an
excellent summary of section 506(b)'s legislative history. In Stephen-
son, the bankruptcy court had awarded oversecured creditor Walter
E. Heller and Co. ("Heller") attorney's fees pursuant to its agreement
with the debtor. The district court reversed, holding Congress had in-
tended that state law govern enforceability and Heller had failed to
136. Id. at 264.
137. Id.
138. 247 B.R. 722 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 728.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 728-30.
143. Hidden Lake, 247 B.R. at 730.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Duralite Truck Body & Container, 153 B.R. 708 (although New York liquidated
damages law would likely enforce YMP, state law is not controlling under section 506(b)).
146. Morse Tool, 87 B.R. 745.
147. 768 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1985).
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comply with state notice requirements. The Fourth Circuit agreed
with Heller that federal law controlled. It reversed the district court
and remanded to the bankruptcy court to determine if Heller's fees
were reasonable.
The Fourth' Circuit provided an exhaustive analysis of section
506(b)'s legislative history, indicating that Congress intended to make
agreements regarding attorney's fees enforceable in bankruptcy even
though state law would deny them effect. 148 For those interested, we
include the entire discussion in a footnote.
149
148. Id. at 585.
149. "The relevant legislative history of section 506(b) began in the House Judiciary Commit-
tee. When the House's version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, H.R. 8200, was referred to the
committee, section 506(b) read as follows:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property whose value is
greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such
claim interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under
the agreement under which such claim arose.
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 506(b) (July 11, 1977), accompanying H.R. Rep. No. 95-595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); reprinted in N. Resnick & E. Wypyski, 12 Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978: A Legislative History, doc. 41 at 79 (1979). H.R. 8200 was amended in committee. One of
the changes was an addition to section 506(b) which read, in part, that "there shall be allowed to
the holder of such claim to the extent collectible under applicable law interest on such claim, and
any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement under which such claim
arose." H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 506(b) (Sept. 8, 1977); reprinted in Resnick & Wypy-
ski, supra, vol. 12, doc. 41 at 387 (emphasis added). In the report accompanying H.R. 8200, the
House Judiciary Committee explained that:
Subsection (b) codifies current law by entitling a creditor with an oversecured claim to
any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement under which the
claim arose. These fees, costs, and charges are secured claims to the extent that the
value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the underlying claim.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356-57 (1977) (emphasis added). When the House
first passed H.R. 8200 on February 1, 1978, section 506(b) remained in the form in which it had
come out of the Judiciary Committee. 124 Cong.Rec. 1, 783-1,804 (1978).
On October 31, 1977, the Senate version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act was introduced and
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. 123 Cong. Rec. 36,095 (1977). The Senate version
of section 506(b) was almost identical to the initial House version. It provided that:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property, the value of which,
after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of
such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim,
any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement under which such
claim arose.
S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 506(b) (Oct. 31, 1977); reprinted in Resnick & Wypyski, supra,
vol. 14, doc. 46 at 86. Senator DeConcini, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and co-
author of the bill, explained in an accompanying report that section 506(b)
codifies current law by entitling a creditor with an oversecured claim to any reasonable
fees (including attorney's fees), costs, or charges provided under the agreement under
which the claim arose. These fees, costs, and charges are [sic] secured claims to the
extent that the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the underlying claim.
S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1977) (emphasis added). Section 506(b) remained
unchanged as S. 2266 was reported out of both the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Finance
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One does not have to adopt Stephenson's position that section
506(b) enforces fees that are unenforceable at state law to accept its
Committee. S. 2266, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. § 506(b) (July 14 and Aug. 10, 1978); reprintedin
Resnick & Wypyski, supra, vol., 17, doc. 53 at 82-83 and 394; see 124 Cong. Rec. 25,305 (1978).
Until early October of 1978, both Houses of Congress continued active consideration of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act amid controversy regarding the Article III status of bankruptcy judges.
Klee, 28 DEPAUL L.REv. 941, 952-56. As the 95th Congress was drawing to a close, substantial
differences remained between the House and Senate versions of the Act. Id. at 953-54. One of
those differences was in section 506(b). The House version retained the explicit requirement
that state law determine the enforceability of attorney's fee agreements. The Senate version
contained no such language.
The differences between the House and Senate versions-of the Act were resolved by the man-
agers of the legislation without a formal conference in late September of 1978. Klee, 28 DEPAUL
L.REV. at 953-54. As an apparent substitute for a formal conference report, Edwards and
DeConcini reported on the compromise bill to their respective Houses of Congress. Using iden-
tical language, they explained that the House version had been rejected and the Senate version
retained and that, as a result, attorney's fee agreements would be enforceable "notwithstanding
contrary law." 124 Cong. Rec. 32,398, 33,997 (1978). The Bankruptcy Reform Act, in its final
form, passed the Senate on October 5, 1978, 124 Cong. Rec. 33,989-34,019 (1978), and the House
on the following day. 124 Cong. Rec. 34, 143-45 (1978).
The confusion that results from the legislative history of section 506(b) arises from the fact
that early on in the legislative process both the House and Senate versions of the Act were
described as codifying current law, even though the two versions contained different language.
Compare H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th'Cong., 1st Sess. 356-57 (1977) with S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1977). Later the Senate Bill was interpreted as having a contrary meaning
even though the Senate language remained the same. Compare S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 68 (1977) with 124 Cong. Rec. 33,997 (1978) (remarks of Senator DeConcini).
This confusion can be resolved through an examination of the fate of the House version of the
bill. The House language that fee agreements "shall be allowed ... to the extent collectible
under applicable law" was added tosection 506(b) by the House Judiciary Committee. The
Committee clearly believed such language was needed in order to explicitly retain the state law
requirement. When this version of section 506(b) was initially passed by the entire House, it was
with the understanding that the state law requirement would be retained.
When the Bankruptcy Reform Act neared the end of the legislative process in September of
1978, two versions of section 506(b) remained. By this point the Senate had had the opportunity
to fine tune many aspects of its version of the bill. See Klee, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. at 949-955.
Although the Senate had ample opportunity to adopt the language of the House version, it
refused to do so. Instead, in the final negotiations which resulted in the compromise bill, see
Klee, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. at 953-54, the Senate insisted on its version. The Senate explicitly
rejected the House language and the House agreed to this significant change. The explicit rejec-
tion of the House language by both Houses of Congress is a clear indication that, under the final
version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Congress intended that state law should no longer gov-
ern the enforceability of attorney's fee agreements. If Congress had desired to retain this pre-
existing requirement, it had the means at its disposal in the form of the House language. That
Congress chose to reject that language' is an indication that Congress chose to reject the pre-
existing law. The statements of Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini that, under the
final version of the Act, fee agreements are enforceable. "notwithstanding contrary law," 124
Cong. Rec. 32,389, 33,997 (1978), consequently reinforce an interpretation of congressional in-
tent behind section 506(b) which is apparent from the legislative process itself.
In sum, we conclude that, in rejecting the House version of section 506(b), Congress intended
to abrogate the pre-existing requirement that attorney's fee agreements were enforceable only in
accordance with state law. Such agreements are now enforceable notwithstanding contrary law."
K.H. Stephenson Supply, 768 F.2d at 582-85.
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more prosaic conclusion that federal. law should supply section
506(b)'s reasonableness standard. Although Stephenson dealt with at-
torney's fees rather than a YMP, section 506(b) imposes a "reasona-
bleness" requirement on all "fees, costs, or charges." It therefore
makes sense to apply a federal reasonableness standard to YMPs as
well. That is the conclusion reached in In re A.J. Lane & Co.150 In
A.J. Lane, Judge Queenan examined whether state or federal law gov-
erned a YMP's reasonableness. He framed the question as "whether
the standard of reasonableness mandated by [section] 506(b) requires
federal courts to fashion their own rules governing what charges are
reasonable, unrestrained by state law." 151 '.
According to Judge Queenan, under the Act, state law governed the
enforceability of such provisions. 152 However, the Act did not impose
an express requirement of reasonableness on a creditor's right to re-
cover fees, charges and 'CoStS.153 "Section 506(b) does, and this re-
quirement alone indicates an intention, to impose a single, federal
standard."'1 54 He 'went on to note that state law generally governs
claims but administrative expenses require special scrutiny because
they are paid before all other unsecured claims. The Code only grants
administrative expense status to actual, necessary costs and expenses
of, preserving the estate. 155 Among administrative expenses are attor-
ney's fees. Section 330(a) only allows reasonable attorney's fees. No
one would argue for anything other than a single federal standard
there:
The protection of general creditors from unreasonable fees enjoying
first priority is central to the bankruptcy policy favoring a fair distri-bution to creditors. Yet this policy applies with even greater force
to charges under [section] 506(b). The claim of a secured creditor to
his collateral is of course senior to that of even a first priority claim-
ant such as an attorney rendering services to the estate. It would
make no sense to interpret "reasonable" as it appears in [section]
506(b) according to state law while applying a federal standard to
"reasonable" under [section] 330(a)(1) governing attorney's fees. 156
2. YMPs Must Satisfy State and Federal Law
Section 506(b)'s legislative history has not persuaded all courts to
interpret section 506(b) as trumping state law. In Ferrari v. Barclays
150. 113 B.R. 821 (Bankr. D. Mass.- 1990).
151. Id. at 823.
152. Id. at 823-24, (citing Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1928)).
153. A.J. Lane, 113 B.R. at 824.
154. Id.
.155. Id.
156. Id.
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American/Business Credit, Inc. (In re Morse Tool, Inc.),157 the court
rebuffed the argument that a charge could be valid under section
506(b) even if it was unenforceable under state law.158 Judge Kenner
acknowledged that, read alone, section 506(b) appeared "to override
any contrary state law regarding the validity of the charges. ' 159 On its
face, section 506(b) only states three conditions for allowing a claim:
(1) the claim had to be oversecured; (2) the charge had to be reasona-
ble; and (3) the charge had to be provided for under the agreement
that gave rise to the claim. Section 506(b) nowhere expressly requires
the charge to be enforceable under state law.1 60
Nevertheless,
section 506(b), however, does not stand alone. It must be read in
conjunction with the remainder of the Bankruptcy Code. As a gen-
eral rule, the Code requires that the validity of claims be deter-
mined according to non-bankruptcy law. The Code defines a
"claim" as a "right to payment," 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), and requires
the Court, upon objection, to disallow claims to the extent that they
are unenforceable "under any agreement or applicable law." 11
U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). 161
According to Judge Kenner, section 506(b) does not expressly over-
ride the Code's general policies nor the specific sections cited. It is
therefore possible to construe it one of two ways. Either section
506(b) creates an implicit exception to the general rule that state law
governs the validity of claims or section 506(b) supplements that
rule.' 62 Judge Kenner thought the latter was the better interpretation.
In her view, the statute's language was unambiguous. She therefore
saw no need to go to legislative history, especially because it de-
pended so heavily on the floor statements of two of the bill's manag-
ers.163 Judge Kenner concluded:
No court should look behind an unambiguous statute for a contrary
intent because, by using the contrary intent as a guide, the court
157. 87 B.R. 745 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
158. Id. at 749. Stephenson and Joseph F. Sanson Investment Co. v. 268 Limited (In re 268
Limited), 789 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1986), which relied on the same legislative history to reach the
same conclusion, both dealt with attorney's fees. There seems general agreement that the princi-
ple of those cases would also apply to YMPs. Judge Kenner certainly made that assumption in
Morse Tool. She did not simply dismiss the argument as inapplicable to YMPs.
159. Morse Tool, 87 B.R. at 748.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. She quoted Representative Edwards and Senator De Concini as saying, "[i]f the security
agreement between the parties provides for attorney's fees, it will be enforceable under title 11
notwithstanding contrary law." Id. at 749 (quoting 124 Cong. Rec. H11095 (daily ed. September
28, 1978) (emphasis added) and 124 Cong. Rec. S17411 (daily ed. October 6, 1978)).
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would be favoring the unenacted history over the statute itself.
Therefore, the plainer the language of the statute, the more con-
vincing the contrary legislative history must be to overcome it....
In this case, the statute (sections 101(4), 502(b)(1) and 506(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code) is relatively clear; its ambiguity can be elimi-
nated with rudimentary principles of statutory interpretation, as was
demonstrated above. The legislative history, on the other hand, is
unconvincing and less reliable than the statute itself.
164
E. Is the YMP a Reasonable Charge under Section 506(b)?
1. A Valid Liquidated Damages Clause Is Reasonable
Whether the court evaluates a YMP's effectiveness at state law or
under a federal standard of reasonableness pursuant to section 506(b),
many courts apply a traditional "stipulated damages" analysis.
165
Under that analysis, the damages stipulated in the contract are en-
forceable only if (1) they represent a reasonable forecast of just com-
pensation for the harm caused by breach, and (2) the harm is difficult
to estimate. 166
Courts undertaking a stipulated damages analysis often begin by es-
tablishing the YMP's function.
The usual purpose ... is to assure that the lender will receive the
contractual rate of return for the life of the loan, or the equivalent
thereof. Such a clause provides protection to a lender against a
downturn in interest rates, which would permit the borrower to refi-
nance the mortgage at a lower interest rate, and thereby deprive the
lender of its unearned interest over the unexpired portion of the
loan.167
Courts identify the function of the YMP to determine what damages it
is seeking to capture. Courts have invalidated them when their
formula for calculating damages fails to discount to present value or is
pegged to the interest rate for United States treasury notes.
168
What is the matter with calculating a lender's damages based on the
difference between the contract interest rate and the interest rate of
treasury bonds? As the court in Kroh Brothers explained, the lender
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 999 (if clause is valid and enforceable as liquidated
damages clause under state law, it is also valid and enforceable in bankruptcy); A.J.. Lane, 113
B.R. at 827 (prepayment charge is provision for liquidated damages and governed by rules appli-
cable to such).
166. See, e.g., Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 999; A.J. Lane, 113 B.R. at 828; Fin. Ctr. Assocs., 140
B.R. at 835; but see Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 503 (classification of prepayment premium language
as liquidated damages provision is not altogether certain but parties have agreed upon this char-
acterization and court accepts it).
167. Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 504-505.
168. See, e.g., Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 505; Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 1000.
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before it as well as the lender in Skyler typically invested in first mort-
gages. Mortgages have much higher interest rates than treasury
bonds. Pegging the lender's loss to treasury bonds would overcom-
pensate the lender. The lender would receive a windfall because it
would reinvest in first mortgages not treasury bonds. 169 The court ob-
served that it would have found that particular feature of the formula
reasonable had the contract provided some means for adjusting the
formula to reflect the lender's rate of reinvestment. 170 The court also
found the YMP wanting because it failed to provide a discount to pre-
sent value. 171 In short, the YMP was an unreasonable forecast of
damages. It was disproportionate to the amount of probable damages
caused and it was oppressive to the debtor.172 (Other than that,
though, it was great.)
Generally, the enforceability of a stipulated damages clause comes
into question when the damages the aggrieved party actually suffers
are significantly less than the damages stipulated in the contract. The
question creates an intractable conflict between two key goals of con-
tract law: compensation (not overcompensation) for losses suffered
and freedom of contract. Just like courts outside the bankruptcy
arena, courts within it have different views on which policy should
prevail. In Financial Center Associates v. The Funding Corp. (In re
Financial Center Associates),173 the court came down resoundingly on
the side of freedom of contract. The court expressly rejected Skyler 174
because the Skyler court limited the parties' freedom of contract. In
Skyler, the court substituted its own judgment regarding the appropri-
ate discount rate for that of the parties.175 That was objectionable:
The magnitude of the loan transaction and quality and quantity of
the loan documents leave little doubt that ... we have an arms-
length transaction between adequately represented sophisticated
businessmen .... Under these circumstances, we feel ... that it
would be offensive to the basic notion of freedom of contract if the
Debtor's arguments were to prevail. Were we to accept Debtor's
position we would be granting borrowers a license to gamble with
Lenders' money regarding the discount rate applicable to pre-pay-
ment charges, a gamble that cannot fail: should the yield on Trea-
sury Bonds go up, the Debtor honors the deal; if, however, the yield
goes down, the Debtor moves to invalidate the pre-payment charge.
169. Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 1000.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1001.
172. See also Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500.
173. 140 B.R. 829, 835 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
174. Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500.
175. Fin. Ctr. Assocs., 140 B.R. at 837.
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Such a result offends our sense of fair play .... It is an attempt to
soften the blow of a bad business judgment. The purpose of chapter
11, whether under the old Act or under the Bankruptcy Code, has
never been designed to absorb the consequences of risk taking.
176
Whether the stipulated damages analysis is characterized as state or
federal, the analysis itself is sufficiently flexible to permit courts to
reach whatever result they choose. The happenstance of bankruptcy
does not alter that reality.
In A.J. Lane,177 Judge Queenan measured the YMP by a federal
standard of liquidated damages. In characteristic fashion, his opinion
discusses the treatment of YMPs beginning with Adam and Eve. He
noted that courts as early as 1829 treated prepayment of an install-
ment contract as a breach of contract absent a contract clause permit-
ting prepayment.1 78 The prepayment charge is a natural result of
viewing prepayment as a breach. A YMP represents the parties' at-
tempt to fix damages for that breach. 179
Judge Queenan went on to test the YMP using traditional contract
principles. He found it wanting on two counts. First, the amount
fixed was unreasonable in light of both the anticipated and the actual
loss. The YMP presumed the creditor would suffer damages and
those damages would "equal lost interest income of one percent for
the balance of the loan.' i80 According to Judge Queenan, it was un-
reasonable to presume a loss. Economic conditions are not static. It
was just as likely that interest rates would go up as down. 181 There-
fore, the YMP was unreasonable in light of the anticipated loss. It was
also unreasonable in light of the lender's actual loss. The lender did
not suffer a loss. In fact, the creditor had benefitted from the prepay-
ment because interest rates had gone up. 182
The YMP also failed the second test. The damages were not diffi-
cult to estimate. The only substantial loss a lender can incur is a loss
of interest income when reinvesting the funds. 183 Such a loss is mea-
sured by a simple and well-established formula: "it is the difference in
the interest yield between the contract rate and the market rate at the
176. Id. at 837-38.
177. A.J. Lane, 113 B.R. 821.
178. Id. at 827.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 829.
181. "And this is precisely what happened." Id.
182. A.J. Lane, 113 B.R. at 829.
183. Id.
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time of prepayment, projected over the term of the loan and then dis-
counted to arrive at present value."'1 84
2. Only Actual Damages Are Reasonable
A.J. Lane seems to hold that a YMP is not reasonable under section
506(b) unless it captures the lender's actual damages.185 Other courts
have made explicit what seems implicit in A.J. Lane.186 For instance,
in In re Outdoor Sports Headquarters,187 the court wrote:
In light of the economic rationale underlying prepayment charges,
the court finds that "reasonable" charges under [section] 506(b) are
those that compensate the lender for the harm caused by the pre-
payment, the amount of actual damages which result from the
prepayment.' 88
The court in dictum in Ferrari v. Barclays American/Business Credit,
Inc. (In re Morse Tool, Inc.)189 agreed, stating a YMP would be rea-
sonable under section 506(b) only if it was "actual and necessary."'190
Therefore, even if the YMP met Connecticut standards for liquidated
damages, the creditor would still have to prove its actual loss.
184. Id.
185. Although A.J. Lane seems to require a showing of actual harm, it is often listed as in the
minority of cases that apply a liquidated damages analysis. See, e.g., AE Hotel Venture, 321 B.R.
at 217 (collecting cases).
186. One recent opinion concludes that a majority of court apply an actual harm standard.
See AE Hotel Venture, 321 B.R. at 217 (collecting cases).
187. 161 B.R. 414 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
188. Id. at 424. See also Imperial Coronado Partners, 96 B.R. at 1001 (YMP is part of credi-
tor's claim but creditor was not entitled to full premium in bankruptcy even if it was entitled to it
at state law because creditor under section 506(b) is only entitled to actual damages measured by
difference between (1) market rate of interest on prepayment date, and (2) the contract rate, for
the remaining term); Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 1001 (YMP was unreasonable under section 506(b)
because it was an unreasonable forecast of damages, it was disproportionate to amount of proba-
ble damages suffered, it was oppressive to debtor, and it did not account for higher interest rates
at the time of prepayment which could result in a windfall to the creditor: Section 506(b)'s
requirement of "reasonable" requires actual costs, charges and fees meaning a YMP is only
reasonable if it provides for a creditor's actual damages); Duralite Truck Body & Container, 153
B.R. at 719-20 ("This court approves of actual damages as the measure of reasonableness for
prepayment charges under section 506(b)" and creditor's ability to prove actual damages was
unlikely given that the interest rate was a floating rate based on prime); Planvest Equity Income
Partners IV, 94 B.R. at 645 (YMP is not reasonable fee under section 506(b) because creditor
failed to show YMP in excess of $300,000 was actual or reasonable cost resulting from prepay-
ment of loan).
189. 87 B.R. 745 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
190. Id. at 750.
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F. Backward "Two-Step" Approach: First Section 506,
Then Section 502
Georgia law allows contracts to provide for attorney's fees of up to
fifteen percent. 191 The fees provided for are recoverable whether
earned or not if the creditor gives the borrower ten days notice. In
Welzel v. Advocate Realty Investments, LLC (In re Welzel), 192 the
debtor had signed several notes agreeing to fifteen percent attorney's
fees. The debtor defaulted, the lender gave the required notice, and
the debtor filed for chapter 11 relief after the ten-day notice period
had expired.
The lender filed a secured proof of claim for $1,125,464.47, includ-
ing $146,799.71 representing attorney's fees. 193 The lender argued it
was entitled to the fees because they had vested prepetition under
state law. The debtor maintained the fees were unreasonable under
section 506(b) and asked the court to disallow them.
The bankruptcy court concluded the fees had vested prepetition,
and they had become part of the lender's allowed claim, but they were
subject to section 506(b)'s reasonableness requirement. 194 According
to the court, not all the claimed fees were reasonable. The court
treated the reasonable portion of the fees as secured, and the unrea-
sonable portion as unsecured. The district court affirmed on the sec-
tion 506(b) issue, but reversed the bankruptcy court's bifurcation of
the fees. The district court denied the lender's claim for any unrea-
sonable fees. 195 A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,196 but the
decision was withdrawn and reheard en banc. The full Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed the district court and reinstated the bankruptcy court's
decision.197
In doing so, the court began with section 506(b) rather section 502.
It saw the threshold issue as whether
contractually set fees constitute "reasonable fees" under [section]
506(b), or whether [the secured creditor] automatically has a right
191. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-11 (2004). The statute requires the note holder to notify the
borrower in writing of the default, and give it 10 days to pay the principal and interest. The
attorney's fees only kick in if the borrower fails to pay within that 10 day period. See GA. CODE
ANN. O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11(a)(3) (2004).
192. 275 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
193. Id. Its actual expenditure for attorney's fees was approximately $40,000. Id.
194. Id. at 1312.
195. Wetzel v. Advocate Realty Investments, LLC (In re Welzel), 243 B.R. 916 (S.D. Ga.
1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 275 F.3d (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
196. Wetzel v. Advocate Realty Investments, LLC (In re Wetzel), 245 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir.
2001).
197. Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308.
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to the entire fees because they vested pre-petition and were en-
forceable under state law.' 98
In deciding that question, the court relied on section 506(b)'s unam-
biguous plain meaning: 199.
Section 506(b) clearly articulates that the attorney's fees arrange-
ment must be spelled out in the loan contract between debtor and
oversecured creditor, but the subsection does not draw a distinction
between fees vested pre- or post-petition, as Advocate would have
us conclude. Instead, the subsection refers blanketly to "reasonable
fees," without differentiation based on the time the fees vested.
Nor does the language of [section] 506(b) indicate that just because
a given fee arrangement is enforceable under state law, it should be
exempt from the reasonableness standard. The literal language re-
fers to whether the loan contract specifies the attorney's fees ar-
rangement, not to whether the arrangement is enforceable under
state law.
Furthermore, Congress has shown that when it wants to exempt a
particular set of items from the reasonableness standard, it does so
explicitly. With regard to interest payments on oversecured claims,
section 506(b) conspicuously leaves out the adjective "reasonable,"
in contrast to the explicit reference to "reasonable fees, costs or
charges." This indicates that Congress, by using "reasonable" with
respect to one set of'items but not another, acted purposefully in
deciding whether to include or exclude the reasonableness standard.
• .. Had Congress intended to exclude a particular set of contrac-
tual attorney's fees from the reasonableness standard-because the
fees either had vested pre-petition or were enforceable under state
laws.. .- it would have spelled this out. Accordingly, we conclude
that in the oversecured creditor context, [section] 506(b) applies a
reasonableness standard across-the-board to all contractually set at-
torney's fees. 200
The court had several other arrows in its quiver. The first was a
distinction between enforceability and reasonableness. Just because a
fee is enforceable at state law does not mean it is reasonable for pur-
poses of section 506(b). In the court's view, section 506(b) "adds a
new level of scrutiny to fee arrangements that goes beyond state law
requirements. '20 1 Moreover, Congress knew how to say state law ap-
plied. It did not do so in section 506(b). 2 2 As a bit of an after-
198. Id. at 1313-14.
199. This approach differed from that of the vacated panel opinion, which focused on section
506(b)'s legislative history rather than its plain language. Welzel, 245 F.3d at 1285-86 (collecting
cases).
200. Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1314-15.
201. Id. at 1315.
202. Id.
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thought, the court turned to legislative history20 3 as the final triumphal
justification that section 506(b)'s reasonableness standard trumped
state law.
Having disposed of the section 506(b) issue, the court considered
how to treat the unreasonable portion of the attorney's fees. Relying
on the "language and structure" of sections 502 and 506(b), it con-
cluded bifurcation was the proper approach, and no equitable consid-
erations prevented its application.
The court first analyzed allowance and disallowance of claims under
the Code. Once a creditor files a proof of claim under section 501, its
claim is allowed unless a party in interest objects.20 4 Even if objection
is made, the bankruptcy court must allow the claim as filed unless a
specific exception says otherwise. 20 5 In this case, no section 502(b)
subsection applied to the unreasonable portion of the attorney's fees.
The court once again stressed the distinction between reasonableness
and enforceability. An unreasonable claim for attorney's fees could
not be an allowed secured claim under section 506(b), but it could be
an allowed unsecured claim under section 502(b).
The court's bottom line was that the two sections
should be read in tandem with one another, for they address com-
plementary but different questions. Section 502 deals with the
threshold question of whether a claim should be allowed or disal-
lowed. Once the bankruptcy court determines that a claim is allow-
able, [section] 506 deals with the entirely different, more narrow
question of whether certain types of claims should be considered
secured or unsecured.206
How should a bankruptcy court apply this in practice?
The threshold question is whether Advocate's claim for its contrac-
tually set attorney's fees is allowed under [section] 502. The entire
claim to fees is allowable under [section] 502 as long as the excep-
tions in subsection (b) do not apply. As already noted, none of
these exceptions apply here, so Advocate's claim for its contractual
attorney's fees passes muster under [section] 502. Given that the
fees claim is allowed, the fees must then be assessed for reasonable-
ness under [section] 506(b). Reasonable fees are then to be treated
as a secured claim. If a portion of the fees are deemed unreasona-
ble, however, the fees should be bifurcated between the reasonable
portion, treated as a secured claim, and the unreasonable portion,
treated as an unsecured claim. By failing to adopt, this bifurcation
203. The court did not delve deeply into section 506(b)'s legislative history. Instead it relied
on two cases which had undertaken "an exhaustive review" of that legislative history: 268 Ltd.,
789 F.2d at 676-77; K.H. Stephenson Supply, 768 F.2d at 582-85.
204. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000).
205. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2000).
206. Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1317-18.
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approach and instead disallowing unreasonable fees, the district
court erred.207
The court turned to the debtor's argument that allowing the lender
an unsecured claim for unreasonable attorney's fees constituted a
windfall that the court should disallow under its equitable powers.
Given its reliance on the language and structure of sections 502(b) and
506(b), the court rejected this argument.208
Finally the court noted that a decision not to bifurcate the creditor's
claim would prefer unsecured creditors over secured creditors. Sec-
tion 506(b) does not apply to unsecured creditors. Unsecured credi-
tors with comparable claims would hold an allowed claim for the
entire contractual amount. Secured creditors would forfeit a substan-
tial part of their claims. This was an "absurd result. '20 9
VI. CONTRACTS THAT PROHIBIT PREPAYMENT BUT
Do NOT PROVIDE A PREPAYMENT PENALTY
In re Vest Assocs. 210 provides another interesting twist. The loan
agreement prohibited the debtor from prepaying the loan (a "lock
out" or "lock in" provision) but it did not provide a remedy in the
event of prepayment. The debtor filed bankruptcy. After attempts to
refinance proved futile, the debtor sold the property to fund a liqui-
dating plan. The lenders filed a claim for $200,000 representing losses
resulting from the debtor's prepayment and $92,000 -in income tax lia-
bility incurred as a result of a sale of the property and prepayment.
211
The lenders ultimately conceded their failure to include a damage
or penalty provision in the loan documents precluded them from re-
covering damages "or any lost interest opportunity or other damages
resulting from prepayment. '212 They sought compensation for the ad-
verse tax consequences they had suffered. They based their request
on section 105. The court characterized their request as in conflict
with section 506(b) which authorizes fees, costs or charges so long as
they are provided for under the loan documents.213
Other than an appeal to my equitable powers, the [lenders] do not
supply any legal authority for the proposition that a bankruptcy
court may read into a contract damage provisions which the parties
themselves have failed to insert regarding the liquidation or calcula-
207. Id. at 1318.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 217 B.R. 696 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).
211. Id. at 699.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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tion of damages arising out of the prepayment of a loan or note.
Unremarkably, there is no supportive decisional law. On the other
hand, as one bankruptcy judge recently noted, there is no reported
decision which allows a prepayment premium in the absence of a
formula for the calculation of that premium being set forth in the
instrument.
2 14
Does the court's reasoning make sense? If a contract prohibits a
debtor from prepaying and the debtor prepays, the debtor has
breached the contract. At common law, the creditor, as an aggrieved
party, is entitled to damages for that breach, just like any other party
aggrieved by the other party's breach. According to traditional con-
tract rules, an aggrieved party is entitled to all damages proximately
caused by the breach if the damages were reasonably foreseeable at
the time of contracting, they were unavoidable, and the aggrieved
party can prove them with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Was the court justified in refusing to supply a remedy when the
creditors failed to do so in their contract? Why could the court not fill
in the gap following traditional common law contract principles? Al-
though Judge Brozman does not address the question, one assumes
she was unwilling to supply a remedy because the issue arose under
section 506(b) and section 506(b) only recognizes charges, fees and
costs provided by the agreement. Section 506(b) is federal law. Fed-
eral law does not recognize a charge, fee or cost that is not provided
by the contract. Therefore, the court was powerless to supply a
remedy.
Exactly what a court can and cannot do under section 506(b) is not
clear. Some courts have supplied a different remedy from the remedy
provided by the parties' agreement. When a court concludes a YMP
is unenforceable because damages are easy to estimate, 215 or enforce-
ment will overcompensate the lender, 216 it might go on to hold the
lender is entitled to its actual damages from early loan termination.217
One court wrote:
We recognize that prepayment premiums are intended to protect
lenders from a drop in interest rates between the date a loan is
made and the prepayment date.., and a lender may have a contrac-
tual right to collect the full amount of a prepayment premium under
nonbankruptcy law.... In our view, however, a lender is entitled,
under section 506(b), to collect only the difference between (1) the
214. Id.
215. A.J. Lane, 113 B.R. 821.
216. See, e.g., In re Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, 287 B.R. 649 (E.D. La. 2002); but see
Hidden Lake, 247 B.R. 722 (YMP enforced even though it would overcompensate secured
creditor).
217. Morse Tool, 87 B.R. at 751.
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market rate of interest on the prepayment date, and (2) the contract
rate, for the remaining term of the loan.218
Because the bankruptcy court had recognized the lender's full YMP,
the BAP remanded to the bankruptcy court to take evidence on the
market rate of interest at the time of prepayment and to "allow the
secured claim accordingly. '2 19
When a court orders a different remedy from the remedy posited in
the parties' contract, the court is supplying a remedy the parties'
agreement did not provide. Technically, section 506(b) does not seem
to authorize that.
VII. SECTION 1124 NONIMPAIRMENT & YMPs
Continental Securities Corp. v. Shenandoah Nursing Home Partner-
ship 220 is another case involving a loan agreement that prohibited pre-
payment but failed to provide a remedy in the event of breach. The
issue in Continental arose in the context of a chapter 11 plan. The
debtor's plan proposed to "cash out" the lender, that is, pay the
lender's claim plus accrued interest. The proposed cash out did not
include any compensation for the debtor's breach of the prepayment
prohibition even though the cash out represented prepayment in vio-
lation of the parties' agreement.
The lender argued the plan impaired its claim. The plan "re-wrote
the terms of the Note, stripping [the lender], without compensation, of
the lost income stream generated by the Note as originally drafted.
' 22
'
The plan altered its contractual and legal rights. Moreover, the lender
asserted, it was not getting under the plan what it would get in a hypo-
thetical liquidation. Therefore, the "best interests" test was not met
and the court could not confirm the plan.
The court agreed the proposed plan did indeed alter its contractual
rights. However, section 1124(3) of the Bankruptcy Code established
that it was unimpaired by the plan.222 Section 1124(3) defined "cash
out" as nonimpairment.
The lender's impairment argument presupposed its claim included a
prepayment penalty. But the contract did not provide a penalty for
prepayment. It only prohibited prepayment. Because the contract
218. Imperial Coronado Partners, 96 B.R. at 1001.
219. Id.
220. 193 B.R. 769 (W.D. Va. 1996).
221. Id. at 774.
222. Until 1994, section 1124 had subsection (3) which essentially provided that a claim was
unimpaired if it was cashed out on the effective date of the plan. The 1994 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code deleted section 1124(3).
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did not provide a prepayment penalty, section 506(b) did not recog-
nize it. Therefore, the lender's claim in bankruptcy was limited to un-
paid principal and accrued interest. The plan's proposal to pay
principal and accrued interest on the effective date of the plan meant
the lender's claim was unimpaired. Because the plan did not impair
the claim, section 1129(a)(7) did not apply because it only applies to
impaired classes of claims. The fact of nonimpairment meant it was
irrelevant that the lender would receive more in a hypothetical
liquidation.
Along with underscoring the need to provide a remedy for breach
of a lock in provision, Continental Securities teaches that a chapter 11
debtor can avoid a YMP by unimpairing the YMP holder. (Nonim-
pairment today also means the best interests test does not apply.) But
nonimpairment also means the lender under the plan gets exactly
what it bargained for, including the interest rate for the duration of
the bargained-for loan term. Nonimpairment is a wonderful strategy
to stifle a lender if the debtor wants to continue the existing loan. It is
not a meaningful strategy if the debtor does not want to or cannot
continue under the existing loan terms.
VIII. YMPs AND "THE EQUITIES OF THE CASE"
In re Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets Partnership223 involved a
$1,295,254.44 YMP. 224 The property was sold postpetition, netting in
excess of $15 million. The creditor was paid its principal of $7 million.
The debtor escrowed over $1.4 million for the account of the creditor.
The court concluded the YMP was not a reasonable charge under
section 506(b). The YMP was the greater of (1) a fixed ten percent of
the prepaid principal; or (2) "the sum of a figure based on the differ-
ence in value of payments under current versus contract interest rates
plus 1% of prepaid principal. ' 225 The lender had failed to introduce
any evidence as to any actual damages from prepayment. In fact, the
lender's representative testified that "he had 'no idea' what [the
lender's] damages would be as a result of the payment of the loan
ahead of schedule. '' 226 In addition, the court noted that the debtor
was not in default under the note when it filed bankruptcy and it
stayed current on its note throughout the course of the bankruptcy. 227
And most importantly, some lower ranked secured lenders would re-
223. 264 B.R. 823 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2001).
224. Id. at 825.
225. Id. at 828.
226. Id. at 830.
227. Id.
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ceive nothing if the creditor were awarded the YMP,228 not to men-
tion the unsecured creditors. 229
According to the court, it had to "consider the equities in making
the determination as to whether the prepayment premium is reasona-
ble. '230 After reciting that the debtor was not in default and did not
want to sell the property, etc., etc., the court cut to the chase:
If [the lender's YMP] is paid in full, the junior secured creditors and
unsecured creditors of the debtor will not be paid in their entirety.
The net effect of allowing [the lender] the premium it seeks is not to
redress [the lender] for its damages, but instead to penalize the
debtor and junior creditors for the debtor's filing of [c]hapter 11
relief - a highly inequitable result that this court is not willing to
condone under all the circumstances of the case.231
And, so, the court disallowed the lender's YMP.
Apparently, lenders are not preparing very well for trial. In another
case,232 another lender's representative testified that "he had no idea
whether [the lender] could obtain a higher rate of return than the rate
of interest on the promissory note in question. 2 33 That failure meant
the lender had failed to prove its actual damages from prepayment.
But
[e]ven if [the lender] could prove its actual damages from the pre-
payment, the Court must still determine that the equities favor al-
lowing [the lender] to recover its penalty .... Here, because the
Contractors' mechanics liens are junior to [the creditor's] deed of
trust, allowing [the lender] to collect its prepayment penalty would
substantially harm the Contractors. Also, [the lender] will collect
approximately $50,000 in default interest. Further [it] will collect its
attorneys' fees expended in litigating this action. Under such cir-
cumstances, the Court finds that it would be inequitable to allow
[the creditor] to collect the prepayment penalty.234
In a word, lenders seeking to recover a YMP need to be able to
prove their actual damages and even then, their ability to collect the
YMP is not certain.
228. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets P'ship, 264 B.R. at 830.
229. Id. at 832.
230. Id. at 831.
231. Id. at 832.
232. Sachs Elec. Co. v. Bridge Info. Sys. (In re Bridge Info. Sys.), 288 B.R. 556 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 2002).
233. Id. at 564.
234. Id.
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IX. SOLVENT DEBTORS AND YMPs
In In re Vanderveer Estates Holdings, Inc.,235 the court held the
creditor was entitled to its YMP. The YMP in Vanderveer was care-
fully crafted in response to the YMP case law. Moreover, and we
think most significantly, the debtor in Vanderveer was solvent.
In Vanderveer, the debtor owed the mortgagee in excess of $75 mil-
lion. The terms of the note entitled the mortgagee to payment of a
YMP
in connection with any prepayment of the loan, "whether the pre-
payment is voluntary or involuntary (in connection with holder
hereof's acceleration of the unpaid principal balance of this Note) or
the Instrument is satisfied by foreclosure (whether by power of sale
or judicial proceeding), deed in lieu of foreclosure or by any other
means."
236
The debtor defaulted prepetition. The mortgagee accelerated prepeti-
tion. At the time of acceleration, the mortgagee demanded payment
of the YMP. The debtor petitioned for chapter 11 relief. "It was
agreed that the debtor was not insolvent" at the time of
confirmation.237
The debtor's plan treated the mortgagee's claim as fully secured but
the claim did not include the YMP. The plan proposed to pay the
mortgagee's claim over the remaining term of the note at the note's
non-default rate of interest. So, the plan was not proposing to prepay
the mortgage. The mortgagee's claim was impaired under the plan
even though the plan proposed to maintain the note's original term
and interest rate. The plan modified the mortgagee'ss rights in other
ways including capitalization of millions of dollars in interest ar-
rears. 238 The plan proposed to pay all the unsecured creditors in full
with interest on the effective date of the plan.
In addition to objecting to confirmation, the mortgagee filed a mo-
tion for determination of secured status. It maintained its secured
claim included, among other things, the YMP.
The court's YMP analysis began with addressing whether the mort-
gagee had a right to receive the YMP given that the debtor's plan did
not propose prepayment. The debtor argued the YMP was only due
upon prepayment and the plan was not proposing to prepay. There-
fore, it was not triggered. The creditor argued the YMP accrued upon
235. 283 B.R. 122 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002).
236. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 126.
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acceleration. 239 The court said it did not have to decide the issue be-
cause the plan impaired the mortgagee's rights and therefore, the
plan's treatment of the mortgagee's claim had to satisfy section
1129(a)(7). Even if the debtor were right, and the YMP did not ac-
crue until prepayment, the YMP would be triggered in a chapter 7
because liquidation would result in prepayment. Therefore, the YMP
was part of the mortgagee's claim and the plan had to pay it to satisfy
the best interests of creditors test if the YMP was enforceable under
state law and allowable under section 506(b). 240
The court looked first to New York law, relying heavily on two Sec-
ond Circuit cases. 241 According to the terms of the note, the YMP
was calculated by
subtracting the yield on a Treasury Note of comparable maturity
from the note interest rate, applying the difference to the remaining
principal balance at the time of prepayment, and discounting that
amount to present value.242
The court concluded the YMP was a valid liquidated damages
clause under New York law. Actual damages were difficult to esti-
mate and the sum stipulated was not "plainly disproportionate" to the
possible loss. 243 Actual damages were difficult to quantify because
several speculative variables existed including "the loss of interest to
the lender, the rate of return on any substitute loan . . ., the duration
of that loan.., and the extent and realizability of the collateral for the
substitute loan .... ",244 Moreover, the YMP reflected the parties'
genuine attempt to forecast damages. The YMP formula did not pro-
duce an automatic premium to the lender in the event of prepayment.
If interest rates went up after the loan was made, the formula would
produce a zero premium.245 In its discussion, the court also men-
tioned that the YMP "was the product of arm's-length negotiations
between sophisticated parties represented by counsel." 246
Having concluded the YMP was enforceable at state law, the court
turned to the YMP's status in bankruptcy. The court noted that if the
mortgagee's right to the YMP had accrued upon acceleration, it would
239. Id. at 126-27.
240. Vanderveer Estates Holdings, 283 B.R. at 127.
241. United Mercs. and Mfrs., 674 F.2d 134; Walter E. Heller & Co. v. American Flyers Airline
Corp., 459 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972); Vanderveer Estates Holdings, 283 B.R. at 128-29.
242. Vanderveer Estates Holdings, 283 B.R. at 132.
243. Id. at 129.
244. Id. at 130.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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be part of the mortgagee's prepetition claim.247 The debtor could not
point to any Bankruptcy Code provision that would limit, restrict, or
disqualify the YMP as part of the mortgagee's prepetition claim. But,
even if the YMP had to pass muster under section 506(b), it would.
The debtor relied on YMP case law to argue that charges are inher-
ently unreasonable under section 506(b) unless they effectively mea-
sure a lender's actual damages. 248 The court rejected the argument
and distinguished the cases. The YMP formula in Vanderveer did not
presume a loss. Moreover, it discounted the damages to present
value.24
9
Indeed, the court observed, the debtor's only quarrel with the YMP
formula was that it measured lost interest using the current yield on a
Treasury Bill of comparable maturity rather than the current market
rate for mortgages.
This objection presumes that the lender will be able immediately to
invest the prepaid monies in a loan of comparable risk, size and
maturity. However, the parties, in negotiating the loan agreement,
chose not to make this assumption. . . . This choice of a Treasury
Bill benchmark is not inherently unreasonable.
250
According to the court, a YMP might impose such a large charge and
be so unfair to the estate and its creditors that it would be struck down
as unreasonable under section 506(b), but this was not such a case. 251
If the debtor is solvent, In re 360 Inns, Ltd.252 identifies yet another
way for a lender to receive its YMP. If the YMP is not enforceable as
a reasonable liquidated damages clause, - if it is not a reasonable
charge under section 506(b), - presumably it is a penalty and as a
penalty, section 726(a)(4) requires the trustee to pay it in full to the
creditor before the trustee pays anything to the debtor. So, in a hypo-
thetical liquidation (of a solvent debtor), the creditor would receive
the YMP. Consequently, confirmation under section 1129(a)(7)
would require the debtor's plan to provide for it.253
X. WHERE ARE WE Now AND WHAT YMP
CHALLENGES LIE AHEAD?
Would the court in Vanderveer have reached the same result had the
debtor been insolvent? One can only wonder, but the opinion identi-
247. Vanderveer Estates Holdings, 283 B.R. at 131.
248. Id. at 132.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 133.
252. 76 B.R. 573 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
253. Id. at 576.
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fies two continuing sources of potential vulnerability - two possible
soft spots - for even the most carefully crafted YMP: (1) its enforce-
ability at state law, and (2) its reasonableness under section 506(b).
Even if the YMP is state-of-the-art in terms of draftsmanship and the
YMP is due and payable whether the lender has or has not acceler-
ated and whether prepayment is or is not voluntary, wiggle room re-
mains. Section 506(b)'s concept of reasonableness and the state law
"rules" regarding stipulated damage clauses are both sufficiently mal-
leable to justify any conclusion a court wants to reach.
Moreover, most debtors in bankruptcy are insolvent. That means
the rights of others will be part of the court's calculus, either explicitly
or sub-rosa. If enforcement of the YMP will overcompensate the
YMP holder to the detriment of the debtor's other creditors, we think
many courts will find a way to deny effect to the YMP.
Stay tuned.
